We examine a novel data set of quarterly holdings for 250 hedge fund advisors over the 1999-2005 period. Stock holdings have some predictive power; in the month following a reported holding, the average annualized risk-adjusted return is 1.0%. The predictive power of option holdings is more pronounced. After excluding non-directional (zero delta) strategies such as straddles and portfolio insurance, stocks underlying holdings of calls and puts exhibit annualized risk-adjusted returns of 6.7% and −11.3%, respectively. We find the greatest return predictability for holdings of deep out-of-the-money options and holdings of puts having high liquidity relative to the underlying stock. Overall, these findings support the predictions of Black (1975) We examine a novel data set of quarterly holdings for 250 hedge fund advisors over the [1999][2000][2001][2002][2003][2004][2005] 
Investors in complete markets should be indifferent between trading a derivative and trading its underlying asset. In practice, portfolio constraints such as margin requirements and short sale restrictions circumscribe the set of trading strategies available to investors. When these constraints bind, an investor with private information might strictly prefer to trade options. This intuition goes back at least to the conjecture of Black (1975, p. 61) :
Since an investor can usually get more action for a given investment in options than he can by investing directly in the underlying stock, he may choose to deal in options when he feels he has an especially important piece of information. Also, it is easier to take a short position by writing options than by shorting the underlying stock. So many information traders will go to the options market rather than the stock market.
In this paper we shed new light on the Black conjecture and related issues by analyzing the stock and option holdings of 250 hedge fund investment advisors in a novel data set of complete quarterly filings of SEC Form 13F over the 1999-2005 period. These data provide a natural laboratory in which to examine the stock and option trading of informed investors. Hedge fund managers face few restrictions on trading derivatives, and their sustained large fees are suggestive of valuable private information. 1 While commercially available data sets based upon 13F filings typically abridge holdings data (most often reporting common stocks only), our data are collected directly from the Securities and Exchange Commission and include options. Our final sample contains 1,395,120 holdings reported in 4,235 separate filings.
We report several new empirical findings. First, we document the composition of reported advisor holdings. Next, we analyze the determinants of the advisors' choice of option holdings versus stock holdings. Finally, we assess Black's conjecture by determining whether option holdings indicate better information than stock holdings.
The composition of advisor portfolios is principally common stock. Common stocks account for 84.8% of the holdings, followed by calls (5.7%), puts (4.7%), debt (3.8%), other (0.8%), and 1 Further supporting the notion that hedge fund positions data are valuable is the recent lawsuit by advisor Bulldog Investors against the SEC rule requiring advisor disclosure (see Business Week, 12 September 2006) . The lawsuit follows previous failed requests for confidentiality exemptions by Warren Buffet and by Relational Holdings. 1 warrants (0.2%). Although options positions constitute a minority of aggregate holdings, the majority of advisors in our sample have reported at least one options holding over the [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] period.
Firm characteristics and market conditions are clearly associated with the choice of options versus stocks. On average, stocks underlying options holdings have higher market capitalizations, lower book-to-market ratios, and higher past returns as compared to optionable stocks that are held as common. The use of an option instead of stock is more likely when the option market offers more available leverage (less moneyness), and when the option market is least illiquid relative to the stock market. We interpret this evidence as support for the model of Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998) , where a pooling equilibrium in which informed investors use options becomes more prevalent as available leverage is greater and available relative option illiquidity is lower.
We next examine the information content of advisors' stock holdings using the subsequent returns on the underlying stocks. We construct stock portfolios based upon reported stock, call, and put holdings at the end of each quarter. If the advisors are informed investors, then their reported stock holdings should be followed by positive abnormal returns. Indeed, over the quarter following reporting, these stock portfolios have a risk-adjusted performance of 0.31% per month as measured by the rubric of Grinblatt and Titman (1993) .
If the option positions contain better information, then the call-based and put-based stock portfolios should exhibit ever stronger subsequent abnormal returns. Using the same risk adjustment, the call-based and put-based portfolios of stocks have abnormal returns of 0.74% and −0.42% per month, respectively. Because of option use in hedging (non-directional trading) strategies such as straddles or portfolio insurance, we also recalculate excluding all such identifiable positions. The resulting call-based and put-based portfolios of stocks have abnormal returns of 0.74% and −0.84% per month, respectively.
Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that informed trade in the options markets 2 reflects the relative transactional efficiency of obtaining a levered or short position in the underlying asset. Specifically, margin requirements would tend to bind in the presence of especially important positive information about stock fundamentals, and this is reflected in the stronger association between call holdings and future stock returns. Conversely, short sales constraints would bind in the presence of strong negative information about stock fundamentals, and this is reflected in a negative relation between put option holdings and subsequent risk-adjusted stock returns.
We examine these hypotheses in more depth by dividing reported option positions into classes based upon implicit leverage and liquidity. Implicit leverage is associated with information quality. The risk-adjusted returns on portfolios formed using stocks whose call (put) option holdings are out of the money average a statistically significant 1.44% (−1.09%) over the month following reporting, as compared to a statistically insignificant −0.07% (0.30%) and 0.86% (0.44%) for portfolios formed from stocks whose option holdings are near the money and in the money, respectively. The effect of relative option liquidity is strong for puts, but not for calls. The risk-adjusted returns on portfolios formed using stocks whose put option holdings are most liquid average a remarkable −2.04% over the month following reporting.
Overall, the evidence suggests that the information contained in options holdings is greatest for deep out of the money options, and is therefore consistent with Black's (1975) conjecture that informed traders are attracted by the implicit leverage of the options markets. We further interpret the evidence on put holdings as consistent with Easley, O'Hara and Srinivas (1998), who argue that informed traders are attracted to the options market when the relative illiquidity of options is low compared to that for the underlying stock.
Our main empirical results clearly show that there is informed trading in the option market.
Nevertheless, our calculated portfolio returns do not themselves imply anything about market efficiency in the weak or semi-strong forms as summarized in Fama (1970) because the advisor 3 option holdings are not publicly observable in real time. Although advisors are required to report on positions held at the quarter-end, most filing are made public only at the end of a 45-day reporting window allotted by the SEC. As a result, the predictability captured in our main test may well correspond to the process of stock prices gradually adjusting to the private component of information in option trading, while adjusting at once to the public information in Form 13F disclosures. 2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses related literature.
Section II describes the data and Section III presents summary statistics. Section IV discusses the methodology and empirical results. Section V concludes.
I Related Literature
A well established literature exists on the aggregate effects of portfolio constraints and options trading. Much evidence, albeit mixed in conclusions, also exists about the existence of price discovery in the option markets at a micro level. From a different angle, researchers more recently have begun to address the effects of option usage on portfolio risk and return at the investor level.
A. Aggregate Effects
Options are redundant securities when markets are perfect and complete. Therefore, Black's conjecture implicitly assumes some degree of market imperfection/incompleteness. In the presence of borrowing constraints, it is easy to posit that traders with a strong positive signal are unable to attain their unconstrained optimum by trading stock alone. In this case, traders can achieve a better result by trading in calls. Likewise, in the presence of short sales constraints, traders with a negative signal would be unable to obtain their unconstrained optimum by trading stock alone.
In this case, traders can achieve their unconstrained optimum by trading in puts.
2 See, e.g., the information-based models of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998) .
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Market imperfections such as short sale constraints are well established factors in asset pricing.
Such constraints can bias observed asset prices, evidence of which dates to Figlewski's (1981) conjecture that short sale constraints keep negative information from being fully reflected in stock prices. Figlewski and Webb (1993) , in turn, report that the introduction of option trading reduces that underweighting of negative information. Danielsen and Sorescu (2001) elucidate a mechanism for the price fall following option introduction. Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006) show that short sale constraints must be accompanied by dispersion of opinion in order to cause upward stock price bias.
Portfolio constraints play important roles in purely theoretical settings as well. For example, Zhang (1997) shows that short sale constraints can generate biased equilibrium stock prices. Incorporating option trading, Basak and Croitoru (2000) demonstrate that short sale restrictions can be a powerful enough wedge to induce arbitrage opportunities between stocks and options, even in a general equilibrium setting. Broadening the analytical framework, Gallmeyer and Hollifield (2007) show that in equilibrium, diversion of capital into the riskless asset might cause risk premia and volatility to increase; in that event, short sale constraints might cause lower rather than higher stock prices.
B. Microstructure and Price Discovery Effects
Much existing work using option market data deals directly with price discovery, highlighting evidence suggesting that informed trades do occur in the option markets. For example, Kumar, Sarin, and Shastri (1992) , and Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004) report that option prices reflect information not already incorporated in the prices of the underlying stocks. Meanwhile, Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998), Cao, Chen, and Griffin (2005) , and Pan and Poteshman (2006) find that option volume is informative about the future direction of option prices. 3 3 See also Mayhew, Sarin, and Shastri (1995) , and Fleming, Ostdiek, and Whaley (1996) .
However, existing evidence also reaches different conclusions. Bhattacharya (1987) concludes that, in the presence of transaction costs, option prices cannot be used to profit on the future direction of stock prices. Vijh (1990) finds that large option trades have only a small impact on option prices, a result that is inconsistent with the presence of informed traders. Chan, Chung, and Fong (2002) find that option quote revisions, and not option net trade volume, has predictive power for stock prices, a result they call "a bit puzzling." In addition, Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998) find a "puzzling" positive relation between pessimistic option volume (i.e., long puts and short calls) and future stock returns. 4
Our work differs along two important dimensions. First, while most of the option volume data used in the above studies are market aggregates that include uninformed and informed trades, our sample design targets a group of investors that one might expect to be informed. This expectation is motivated by recent evidence of neutral after-fee hedge fund performance despite large fees being awarded to fund managers. 5 Using the holdings data, we can further focus our analysis of directionally informed trading by discriminating among option trades that are part of non-directional strategies, like straddles and protective puts. 6 Second, while prior studies examine whether option market activity is informative at all about future stock prices, to our knowledge we are the first to directly compare the information contained in option and stock holdings. This is important because, according to Black (1975) , an informed trader's option holdings should be more informative about future stock prices than the trader's stock holdings. Our work here is 4 Other examples of disagreement in the literature include Vijh (1988) , who argues that a bid-ask bounce effect influences Manaster and Rendlemen's (1982) finding that option prices lead stock prices. Also, Chang, Chung, and Johnson (1993) argue that discreteness in option price data could explain Stephan and Whaley's (1990) finding that stock prices lead option prices.
5 Aragon (2007) concludes that average hedge fund performance net-of-fees is not different from zero after controlling for restrictions on fund investor liquidity. Anecdotal evidence includes James Simons of Renaissance Technologies making $1.5 billion in 2005, while his flagship Medallion fund returned 29.5 percent, net of fees; and T. Boone Pickens Jr. made $1.4 billion in 2005, largely from returns on his two energy-focused hedge funds. Source: http://www.finfacts.com/irelandbusinessnews/publish/article 10005996.shtml 6 One exception to the above studies is Pan and Poteshman (2006) , who find stronger stock return predictability for the subsample of option volume directed through full-service brokerages. They remark (p.873), "Given that the option volume from full service brokerages includes that from hedge funds, this result is hardly surprising." made possible because, contrary to common belief, stocks as well as options are 13F reportable securities.
C. Portfolio Level Effects
Finally, our results also add to the little available evidence on the actual use of derivatives by investment managers. Koski and Pontiff (1999) find similar risk exposure and return performance for mutual funds that use and do not use derivatives. They argue that derivatives allow mutual funds to efficiently manage changes in fund risk. Chen (2006) studies hedge funds and finds lower return volatility among funds with a stated policy of using derivatives, as compared to funds with no such policy. Both studies highlight the non-speculative (hedging) motives for derivatives usage.
We instead intend our analysis to illuminate another important use of derivatives by investment managers: to profit from private information about the direction of the underlying stock. 7
II Data
A. Section 13(f) and Form 13F
According to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as amended in 1975 to enact Section 13(f), "every [institutional investment] manager which exercises investment discretion with respect to accounts holding Section 13(f) securities, having an aggregate fair market value on the last trading day of any month of any calendar year of at least $100,000,000 shall file a report on the last day of each of the first three calendar quarters of the subsequent calendar year." The Official List of Section 13(f) Securities, published by the SEC each quarter, lists the securities that a manager must report in Form 13F. For each 13(f) security, the manager is required to report the name of the security issuer, title of the issue, security CUSIP, fair market value, and amount of the 7 Derivatives usage has also been inferred from nonlinear patterns between hedge fund returns and market factors. See, for example, Fung and Hsieh (2001) and Agarwal and Naik (2004) .
security. The official list includes many security types, including US and foreign common stocks, debt securities, preferred stock, and equity options. Table I shows that options typically make up 40-45 percent of the Official List of 13(f) Securities. 8
A manager may omit holdings otherwise reportable if the manager holds, at the end of each quarter, fewer than 10,000 shares (or less than $200,000 principal amount in the case of convertible debt securities) and less than $200,000 aggregate fair market value (and option holdings to purchase only such amounts). The last condition means that short positions can be (and in fact sometimes are) omitted from the filings. Hedge fund advisors' short positions could at times constitute a significant portion of their total portfolio. Nevertheless, our main research question is whether observable positions contain information about future returns, and not about advisors' portfolio performance. Thus, any omission of short positions would have the effect of weakening our ability to reject the null hypothesis that the complete set of advisors' holdings contains no information about future stock returns.
Form 13F has specific rules for the reporting of options. A manager must report holdings of options only if the options themselves are 13(f) securities. For purposes of the $100,000,000 threshold, the manager should consider only the value of such options, not the value of the underlying shares. The manager must give the entries about CUSIP, fair value, and amount in terms of the securities underlying the options, not the options themselves. Advisors are also required to report whether the options are calls or puts. Although Form 13F makes no explicit request for an option's striking price or maturity date, we can exactly identify these additional contract features for a subset of holdings. 9
The omission of option holdings in studies of 13F filings is usually unavoidable because the databases compiled by Thomson Financial and/or CDA/Spectrum apply an additional filter to the original filings. According to Thomson, "[the data] provide detail on holdings of US equities, and a limited set of other securities, including foreign stocks...the CDA and TFN criteria omit some equity holdings that could not be matched to a master security file...Fixed income holdings are not intentionally included, but the holdings may include cash-like holdings in cases where the reported CUSIP could be matched to a security master file." Table II presents a striking example of the disconnect between a complete 13F filing, obtained directly from the SEC, and the incomplete filings data available from Thomson. This evidence suggests that Thomson's master security file does not include preferred stock, debt securities, and equity calls, puts, and warrants. In this study we avoid abridgment by collecting a sample of complete 13F filings directly from the SEC.
B. Hedge Fund Investment Advisors
We identify hedge fund investment advisors through two sources. First, we use Bloomberg's published list of all 13(f)-obligated hedge fund managers. Second, we use the Lipper/TASS database to identify the investment advisors of hedge funds. Each individual fund in TASS reports the name of its management firm. These names are then manually matched with SEC EDGAR in order to identify which advisor firms are subject to Section 13(f). The TASS database lists the investment advisors of both live and defunct hedge funds, thereby reducing the potential for survivorship bias.
Our sample of hedge fund managers is merged with all available quarterly 13F filings from the SEC Edgar website. This includes any amendments that might have been filed by the investment manager in relation to a confidential treatment request and/or restatement. Our sample period begins in the first quarter of 1999-the earliest period for which 13F's are available in electronic format from EDGAR. Although downloading the individual 13F files are straightforward, the formatting is complex and laborious to decipher because each filing has manager-specific idiosyncracies. Therefore, our analysis considers a random sample of 250 managers.
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C. Other Data
In the analysis we use option market characteristics provided by the Ivy OptionMetrics database. We also use CRSP daily and monthly files. The returns are adjusted for stock delisting to avoid survivorship bias, following Shumway (1997) . 10 
III Summary Statistics
A. Advisor Holdings By Security Type
Our raw sample consists of the 2,003,882 advisor-quarter-filing holdings reported in 4,961 separate filings. As expected, the non-amendment filings constitute the majority (86.1%) of all filings. Amendment filings induce double-counting because many amendments restate the original holdings in addition to the new holdings for which the amendment was filed. We therefore focus the analysis on the 1,536,856 holdings listed in the non-amended filings. Each holding is segregated into one of six security type categories based upon advisors' descriptions reported in the filings. We focus the analysis on holdings of common stock and call and put options. However, other reported security types include standard and convertible debt, standard and convertible preferred stock, warrants, and other securities for which there no definitive classification could be determined.
The final sample is obtained by merging the raw sample with the CRSP monthly files by the 6-digit issuer number contained in the security's CUSIP. 11
Our main test has to do with the information content of option volume for the direction of future underlying stock price. However, investment advisors may trade options for purposes that are unrelated to private information about stock fundamentals. In the analysis we classify a call option position as directional if the advisor does not simultaneously report a position in a put option on the same underlying security. Likewise, we classify a put option position as directional if the advisor does not simultaneously report a position in any other non-put security issued by the underlying firm. This criterion thus classifies straddles and protective put strategies as non-directional options strategies. 12 Table III tabulates the reported holdings of hedge fund investment advisors by security type.
Common stock constitutes the majority (84.8%) of reported holdings. In contrast, approximately 3.8% of the total reported 13(f) holdings are debt securities. This roughly corresponds to the proportion (5%) of all debt securities in the Official List of 13(f) Securities. The proportion of options-based positions that are either call or put equals 10.4%. Table III also shows how the mean frequency of use of different security types varies across investment advisors. The majority of advisors in our sample report at least one option holding. In term of number of positions, the asset allocation of the mean advisor consists of 238 common stock, 11 debt, 14 calls, 11 puts, and 4 other securities. The extent to which options are used does vary across advisors. Figure 1 shows the time series of the average allocation to call and put options over the sample period. While there appears to be a slight overall upward trend in options usage for our sample of advisors, they remain a small portion of the portfolios of these hedge funds in comparison with stocks. Options are being chosen carefully and somewhat rarely as the investment vehicles of choice. Moreover, the figure allays any potential concern that option holdings cluster particularly prevalently, relative to stock holdings, at specific times in the sample period.
B. Stock and Option Market Liquidity
Previous research argues that the relative liquidity differences between the stock and option markets influence trading. For example, Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998) argue that illiquidity is an important determinant of an informed trader's attraction to the option market. An informed trader may therefore choose not to trade options if the option market liquidity is low as compared to trading in the underlying stock. We construct a measure of relative option market illiquidity in the spirit of Amihud (2002) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) . Specifically, we define
Amihud's (2002) measure of stock illiquidity is given by
where D s it is the number of days for which data are available for stock i in month t, R itd is the return on stock i on day d in month t and V OLD itd is the respective daily volume in dollars. We construct the variable ILLIQ o i,t in an analogous fashion for the option market using daily price quotes and volume from OptionMetrics. However, many individual option contracts are rarely traded, in which case ILLIQ is not defined. Dropping these observations would lose too much information. Instead, our measure of option illiquidity is defined as the volume-weighted average illiquidity across all traded options for a given underlying security. Specifically, we calculate
it is the number of days for which options data are available for stock i in month t, J itd is the number of options traded on stock i on day d in month t, R ijtd is the return on option j on stock i on day d in month t and V OLD ijtd is the respective daily volume in dollars.
C. Firm and Market Characteristics
In this section we make comparisons of the key characteristics of the common stocks underlying the observed stock and option holdings. We are careful to exclude all stock holdings for which no option markets currently exist. We identify optionable stocks in a given quarter as stocks with
non-zero open interest reported in OptionMetrics for the same quarter. In Table IV all option traded on a given underlying security. Table IV shows that our two measures of moneyness are typically lower for securities underlying call and put option holdings, as compared to stock holdings. For example, the minimum available moneyness is typically -64% for the securities underlying call option holdings, as compared to -51% for stock holdings themselves.
Similar patterns are observed for the typical stock underlying put options. This suggests that our advisors are more likely to hold options when the available leverage achievable through the option market is higher.
Finally, in 
IV Methodology and Results
A. The Main Test
The units of observation in our analysis are stock portfolios constructed at the advisor-level based upon the reported common stock or option positions at each quarter-end. Therefore, each quarterly 13F report delivers a maximum of three stock portfolios, each of which corresponds to either the common stock, call option, or put option positions. In each portfolio formed from common stock positions, a stock's portfolio weight equals the market value of that stock held as common divided by the aggregated market value of all stocks held as common. Likewise, in the call option-based portfolio, a stock's portfolio weight equals the market value underlying the call positions on that stock divided by the aggregated market value underlying all reported call positions.
14 Our main tests are motivated by the performance evaluation literature where holdings are correlated with future information to infer talent or its absence. We follow Grinblatt and Titman (1993) and Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) and consider two weight-based measures of performance. We choose these two approaches for their philosophical contrast; the former is benchmark-free, and the latter employs a characteristic-based benchmark. For each advisor and month, we calculate
where w n,t,i is advisor n's portfolio weight in security i at the end of month t, r i,t is the month t return on stock i, and the summation is taken over all securities I. Portfolio weights are held constant across months within each quarter at the previous quarter-end weights. The second measure of performance is calculated as
where r i,b,t is the month t return on stock i's characteristic-based benchmark portfolio. A benchmark portfolio return is the value-weighted return on a group of stocks of similar market value, book-to-market ratio, and lagged one-year returns. 13
The portfolio change measure (GT) reflects the month t difference in returns between two portfolios: the actual portfolio held at the end of month t − 1 and the lagged portfolio held at the end of month t − 4. The characteristic-adjusted measure (DGTW) is the difference between the month t return of the portfolio held at the end of month t − 1 and the month t return of the matching control portfolio. Both quantities are valid performance measures to the extent that the lagged weights and benchmark portfolio returns capture expected weights and expected returns, respectively. 14 Our main test is whether investment advisors' stock and options holdings contain private information about future stock returns. We calculate the time-series average of returns for stock portfolios formed on the basis of stocks held as common, stocks underlying calls, and stocks held as puts. Specifically, we test
and likewise for DGTW. The term inside the square brackets denotes the month t performance of a portfolio with weights
n=1 w s n,t−1,i in the stock of issuer i, where N s t is the number of advisors that report a holding in security type s at the end of month t − 1, and w s n,t−1,i is the share of advisor n's holdings of security type s allocated to issuer i at the end of month t − 1. 15 Grinblatt and Titman (1989) show that the covariance of portfolio weights and future returns must be positive for an informed investor with non-increasing Rubinstein absolute risk aversion.
B. Results and Discussion
15 Another interpretation of Eq. (3) is the average coefficients from 84 cross-sectional regressions:
where DCOM M ONs is an indicator variable for whether advisor n's performance corresponds to stocks held as common; DCALLs and DP U Ts are similarly defined. 16 This figure is comparable to other measurements of hedge funds' stock picking ability. For instance, Griffin and Xu (2007) report that stock selections of hedge funds outperform those of mutual funds by 1.32% per year.
The average risk-adjusted return on portfolios of stocks underlying call option holdings equals 74 and 56 basis points per month for the GT and DGTW measures, respectively. We therefore reject the null hypothesis that options holdings do not contain information about future stock returns. Furthermore, we can reject the null hypothesis that the DGTW risk-adjusted returns on call option and common stock holdings-based portfolios are equal. The p-values corresponding to a two-sided test are 0.06 and 0.13 for the DGTW and GT measures, respectively.
Monthly risk-adjusted returns on portfolios of stocks underlying put options average −42 and −69 basis points for the GT and DGTW measures, respectively. This would seem consistent with the idea that put holdings reflect a pessimistic view of future stock price performance, but only the DGTW point estimate is statistically significant. However, our earlier discussion notes that put options are often used in non-directional strategies for hedging. Therefore, an analysis of the full sample of option holdings potentially confounds our inferences about the extent to which directional information is contained in option holdings.
In Panel B of Table VI we report on the risk-adjusted returns after excluding all options holdings that represent non-directional strategies with respect to a given security issuer. Our findings for call option-based stock portfolios are qualitatively similar to the earlier results: on average, portfolios of stocks underlying call option holdings earn significant risk-adjusted returns of 74 or 56 basis points per month, depending on the measure. The results for put option holdings are striking. In contrast to our finding for the full sample option holdings, the portfolio of stocks underlying put option holdings average approximately −90 basis points per month in risk-adjusted returns. Both estimates here are significant.
Overall, our findings of significant risk-adjusted returns for stock-based, call option-based, and put-option based portfolios support the view that our sample of advisors are privately informed about the future direction of the underlying stock.
C. Comparing the Information in Stock and Option Positions
According to Black (1975) , the information contained in call and put holdings is much more important relative to stock holdings. Therefore, our second hypothesis has to do with whether the information about the direction of future stock prices, as reflected in an advisor's holdings, varies with security type. To sharpen our comparison of the information contained in stock and options positions, we exclude all non-option users from the test. For example, the stock and callbased portfolios are formed after excluding all advisers that never report a call position during our sample period. Specifically, we test
where GT s i is the i'th advisor-month observation of the Grinblatt and Titman (1993) Under this assumption, the relevant test is whether the risk-adjusted return of the put-based stock portfolios is less than the risk-adjusted return of a short position in a portfolio formed on the basis of stocks held as common. Specifically, we test
In Panel B of Table VII we report the results for put-based holdings. The stocks underlying puts exhibit significant negative abnormal performance, -0.32% (GT) and -0.53% (DGTW)
per month, and even more so after excluding non-directional strategies, -0.75% (GT) and -0.89%
(DGTW) per month. Across the board, the stocks underlying directional puts significantly underperform a short stock portfolio formed from the common stock holdings of put-using advisors, by -0.49% (GT) and -0.72% (DGTW) per month. Overall, the evidence reported in Table VII supports the notion that, as compared to advisers' common stock holdings, directional positions in the option market are more informative about the future direction of the underlying stock.
D. Additional Determinants of Informed Investors' Call and Put Holdings
Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998) argue that leverage and illiquidity are two key variables affecting an informed investor's decision to trade in the option market. In this section we examine whether these variables do indeed represent determinants of the information content of option holdings. First, we partition our sample of option holdings into three groups based on the current option moneyness. It is well known that, in a Black and Scholes (1973) setting, European call and put option elasticity is greater for options that are further out of the money. The breakpoints for our option groups (3% for both in-the-money and out-of-the-money) are aligned with those of Pan and Poteshman (2006) .
In Table VIII Panel A, we report the average benchmark-adjusted performance measure in Eq.
(2) for stocks underlying call and put options of varying moneyness. Despite a large reduction in sample size due to sparse reporting of strike price and expiration information, we find that benchmark-adjusted returns are significant for out of the money call and put options. For example, the average DGTW-adjusted return on call-holdings based portfolio is a significant 1.44% over the month following the quarterly reporting date. In contrast, abnormal returns are an insignificant −0.07% and 0.86% for stocks underlying call options near the money and out of the money, respectively. A similar pattern is found for stocks underlying puts. Only the out of the money group exhibits significant returns, −1.09%.
The second key determinant of informed trader participation in options that is identified by Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998) is option market illiquidity. To examine this issue we partition our sample of option holdings into terciles based upon relliq-our measure of option market illiquidity relative to the underlying stock. For each option position, our measure of relative illiquidity is the average monthly relative illiquidity measure for the year ending at the start of the previous quarter. The first tercile corresponds to options that are least illiquid relative to the underlying stock, and these are labeled the most liquid options.
In Table VIII Panel B we report the average benchmark-adjusted performance measure in Eq.
(2) for call and put options across liquidity terciles. Average DGTW benchmark-adjusted returns are indeed negative and significant for stock portfolios formed from put option holdings in the highest liquidity tercile, in fact a striking -2.04% in the month following the quarter end report.
The results for call options are inconclusive.
V Conclusion
Hedge fund managers are required to disclose their holdings, but in a heretofore very inaccessible fashion. Their reports are buried in an avalanche of other institutional disclosures. We 20 decipher seven years of these disclosures to build a compelling portrait of informed trader holdings in the stock and option markets. Consistent with the conjecture of Black (1975) , the investment ideas with the most punch appear to be the ones taken to the option market for implementation.
Whereas a portfolio constructed from hedge fund stock holdings does well, between 1.0%-3.7%
per year alpha depending on the benchmark, stock portfolios constructed from hedge fund option holdings do remarkably well, particularly when ignoring options employed in non-directional hedging strategies. Buying stocks in which hedge funds take call option positions and holding for one month gives a portfolio exhibiting 6.7% per year alpha. Buying stocks in which hedge funds take put option positions and holding for one month gives a portfolio exhibiting −11.3% per year alpha.
The informed character of the holdings in our database makes it an interesting laboratory for testing the predictions of the model in Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998) , about what characteristics drive the informed trader's choice of market venue. Consistent with the model, we find that higher liquidity and higher available leverage tend to be features attracting informed trades to the option markets. The abnormal stock returns in the month following reported out-ofthe-money option holdings and relatively liquid put holdings are particularly extreme. Annualized stock alphas are 17.3%, −13.1%, and −24.5% for stocks underlying out-of-the-money calls, outof-the-money puts, and relatively liquid puts, respectively. These numbers emphatically point out the informed character of hedge fund trades, but they do not directly measure hedge funds' performance; indeed, they likely understate the realized profits of the hedge funds undertaking the actual option trades. The table displays the Form 13F filed by a California advisor of $11 billion in assets for the 1st quarter of 2004. Issuer is the name of the issuer, type is the type of the issuer, amount is the number of shares, and value is the market value of the security (in thousands of dollars). For debt securities the amount represents the principal amount. For calls and puts, amount and value correspond to the underlying asset. The table reports average monthly returns (in percent) for equally-weighted stock portfolios formed based upon hedge fund advisors' holdings of 13(f) reportable securities. Quarterly reported market values of common stock holdings and notional amounts of options holdings are used to construct advisor-specific portfolios of the underlying common stock. Monthly raw returns and performance of these portfolios are generated over the following quarter assuming monthly rebalancing at the previous quarter's portfolio weights. The table reports the time series of the average raw return and performance across advisors. The GT measure is calculated by subtracting the time t return of the portfolio held at month t−4 from the time t return of the portfolio held at t − 1. The DGTW measure is the difference between the time t return of the portfolio held at t− 1 and the time t return of the time t− 1 matching control portfolio. The return on a control portfolio is the value-weighted return on a group of stocks of similar market value, book-to-market ratio, and lagged one-year returns. The return for each year is the average monthly return for that year. 
Comparing the Information Contained in Stock and Option Positions
The table reports the average performance (in percent per month) of advisor-specific portfolios formed from the holdings of 13(f) reportable securities over the 1999-2005 period. Quarterly reported market values of common stock holdings and notional amounts of options holdings are used to construct advisor-specific portfolios of the underlying common stock. Monthly raw returns and performance of these portfolios are generated over the following quarter assuming monthly rebalancing at the previous quarter's portfolio weights. The table reports the average values across advisor/month observations by security type. The GT measure is calculated by subtracting the time t return of the portfolio held at month t − 4 from the time t return of the portfolio held at t − 1. The DGTW measure is the difference between the time t return of the portfolio held at t − 1 and the time t return of the time t − 1 matching control portfolio. The return on a control portfolio is the value-weighted return on a group of stocks of similar market value, book-to-market ratio, and lagged one-year returns. The table reports The Information in Option Holdings by Option Moneyness and Liquidity
The table reports the average performance (in percent per month) of advisor-specific portfolios formed from the hedge fund advisors' option holdings of varying degrees of moneyness and option market liquidity. Quarterly reported market values of common stock holdings and notional amounts of options holdings are used to construct advisor-specific portfolios of the underlying common stock. Monthly raw returns and performance of these portfolios are generated over the following quarter assuming monthly rebalancing at the previous quarter's portfolio weights. The table reports the average values across advisor/month observations by moneyness groups (Panel A) and option liquidity groups (Panel B) within each security type. The DGTW measure is the difference between the time t return of the portfolio held at t − 1 and the time t return of the time t − 1 matching control portfolio. The return on a control portfolio is the value-weighted return on a group of stocks of similar market value, book-to-market ratio, and lagged one-year returns. The 
